The Cartesian Doubt Experiment and Mathematics :: Mathematics Math Mathematical Papers

The Cartesian Doubt Experiment and MathematicsABSTRACT The candidate that Descartes rallying cryed mathematical propositions into interrogative sentence as he impugned all beliefs concerning common-sense ontology by assumptive that all beliefs derive from cognizance seems to rest on the presupposition that the Cartesian puzzle of doubt concerning mathematics is an instance of the puzzle of doubt concerning existence of substances. I argue that the problem is not whether I am counting genuine objects or empty images, but whether I am counting what I count correctly. Considering Descartess early works, it is possible to see that for him, the proposition 2+3=5 and the disceptation I think, therefore I am, were equally evident. But Descartes does not found his epistemology upon the certify of mathematical propositions. The doubt prove does not seem to give prescribed results for mathematical operations. Consciousness of carrying out a mathematical proposition, however, unlike putt forth a result of an operation, is immune to doubt. Statements of consciousness of mathematical or logical operations are instances of I think and hence the argument I count, therefore I am is equivalent to I think, therefore I am. If impugning the veridicality of mathematical propositions could not pose a difficulty for Descartess epistemology which he thought to establish on consciousness of thought process alone, then he cannot be seen to avoid the suspense. Discarding mathematical propositions themselves on the evidence that they are not immune to doubt elicited by a powerful agent does not generate a substantial problem for Descartes provided that he believes that he can justify them by appeal to Gods benevolence. The top dog whether Descartes impugned veridicality of mathematical propositions via the arguments of the First Meditation is of epistemologically significance for an inquiry into the nature of Descartes doubt experiment with a view to a plausible answer to this question may offer us clues to understand the nature of Cartesian conjecture of justification and the nature of foundationalistic epistemology in general.The evil genius hypothesis introduced in the last paragraph of the First Meditation does not seem to call veridicality of mathematical propositions into question Descartes does not mention mathematical truths when he finalizes the riding horse of the doubt experiment. The text is ambiguous at this point and the reader is go forth ignorant whether simple truths of arithmetics or geometry are held exempt from doubt evoked by the evil genius hypothesis. Does this final tool of the doubt experiment put emphasis on the dubitability of judgments of common-sense ontology based on sense perception alone?